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ABSTRACT
This essay explores the complex entanglement of new 
reproductive technologies, genetics, health economics, 
rights- based discourses and ethical considerations 
of the value of human life with particular reference 
to representations of Down’s syndrome and the 
identification of trisomy 21. Prompted by the debates 
that have occurred in the wake of the adoption of non- 
invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), the essay considers 
the representation of Down’s syndrome and prenatal 
testing in bioethical discourse, feminist writings on 
reproductive autonomy and disability studies and in a 
work of popular fiction, Yrsa Sigurdardóttir’s Someone To 
Look Over Me (2013), a novel set in Iceland during the 
post-2008 financial crisis. It argues that the conjunction 
of neo- utilitarian and neoliberal and biomedical models 
produce a hostile environment in which the concrete 
particularities of disabled people’s lives and experiences 
are placed under erasure for a ’genetic fiction’ that 
imagines the life of the ’not yet born’ infant with Down’s 
syndrome as depleted, diminished and burdensome. With 
close reference to the depiction of Down’s syndrome 
and learning disability in the novel, my reading explores 
the ways in which the generic conventions of crime 
fiction intersect with ideas about economics, politics and 
learning disability, to mediate an exploration of human 
value and social justice that troubles dominant deficit- led 
constructions of disability.
INTRODUCTION
This essay considers the ways in which Down’s 
syndrome (trisomy 21) is imagined and materialised 
in contemporary culture across different domains; 
within the discourses and apparatus of prenatal 
testing, recent feminist and disability scholarship, 
and in popular genre fiction, in this instance, 
the Icelandic author Yrsa Sigurdardóttir’s novel 
Someone to Watch Over Me (Sigurdardóttir 2013). 
It explores the complex entanglement of new repro-
ductive technologies, genetics, health economics, 
rights- based discourses and ethical considerations 
of the value of human life, exploring the articu-
lation of ableism with what Andre Gorz describes 
as a resolutely instrumental economic rationality 
“dominated by the concern for efficiency, produc-
tivity, and optimum performance”(Gorz 2012, 
44). Setting out to identify some of the genetic 
fictions that have emerged as an effect of these 
relationships, the essay speaks to debates within 
and without feminism and disability studies as to 
the implications of new genetic technologies on the 
lives of disabled people, particularly the extent to 
which these technologies render some groups of 
people with genetic conditions existentially vulner-
able, with the potential literally to screen them out 
of existence. It makes a case for the significance of 
imaginative literature in this context in enabling 
a more nuanced understanding of these complex 
debates via a critical reading of Sigurdardóttir’s 
novel that opens up a space for the expression of 
alternative conceptions of human value embodied 
in eccentric figures characterised by a strong differ-
ence; a young man with Down’s syndrome and a 
young autistic man.
Mindful of the contemporary political usage 
of the phrase ‘hostile environment’ in the UK to 
convey the creation of an environment in which the 
lives of migrants are deliberately rendered unbear-
ably difficult (Liberty Human Rights 2019), I deploy 
it here to describe the emergence and embedding of 
thinking about prenatal genetic testing and Down’s 
syndrome across multiple, overlapping forms and 
sites of learning in which disability is predominantly 
framed in terms of deficit, difficulty, parental disap-
pointment and struggle. This ‘pedagogy’ (Giroux 
2004) of suffering and parental burden taps into 
the realities of systemic ableism, from lack of 
support, poverty, poor educational opportunities, 
low aspiration and unequal access to healthcare but 
does so in order to reinforce rather than challenge 
structural inequality, discriminatory attitudes and 
practices. As Gareth Thomas notes, screening for 
Down’s syndrome has become a routine element 
of prenatal care and this in itself enmeshes percep-
tions of what it means to identify trisomy 21 with 
ideas of risk and the potential (and pressure) to take 
‘preventative’ action (Thomas 2017, 1).
The first part of this essay maps the contours 
of this hostile environment including justifications 
and challenges to prenatal screening programmes 
and the implications of the adoption of particular 
technologies most recently and notably that of 
cell- free DNA (cfDNA) testing, commonly known 
as non- invasive prenatal testing (NIPT). This tech-
nique, marketed globally under the brand name 
the Harmony, involves taking a blood sample 
from a pregnant person in the first trimester at 9 
or 10 weeks and works by counting the number 
of placental cfDNA fragments from the different 
chromosomes present in the mother’s blood. It 
enables the measurement of the underlying genetic 
makeup of trisomy 21 (Down’s syndrome), trisomy 
18 (Edwards syndrome) and trisomy 13 (Patau 
syndrome) (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2017). 
The stated advantages of NIPT is that it is more 
accurate than the combined test (Taylor- Phillips 
et al. 2016) and carries no known risk of miscar-
riage (Public Health England Blog 2016). However, 
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as I will discuss, this screening technique presents a significant 
ethical challenge from a disability rights- based perspective.
I go on to consider some of the material effects of this assem-
blage of techniques, epistemologies and bodies, focusing particu-
larly on the evocation of two powerful genetic fictions in the 
fields of prenatal genetic testing and discourses of reproductive 
choice in contemporary feminism: the imagined but not yet/
perhaps never to be born infant with Down’s syndrome and the 
imagined but not yet/perhaps never to be materialised figure of 
the ‘mother’ who suffers. I focus here on the place and function 
of trisomy 21 in prenatal diagnosis and argue that by virtue of 
the ease with which trisomy 21 is detected, Down’s syndrome 
has come to function as the imagined difference that encodes 
fears about the value and ‘quality’ of disabled peoples’ lives 
more generally. It thus carries the freight of a deeply entrenched 
ableism despite all that we know about the rich and varied 
lives that people with Down’s syndrome lead and indeed about 
contingency and the potential for any child or adult to develop 
an illness or impairment, what Marianne Hirsch describes as our 
“common vulnerability emerging from the condition of living in 
bodies and in time” (Hirsch 2016, 80).
I develop this argument fully cognizant of the tensions that 
often emerge between a feminist pro- choice perspective (a posi-
tion with which I agree) and a disability rights- based argument 
that the detection of trisomy 21 alone is not sufficient grounds 
on which to terminate an otherwise wanted pregnancy (a posi-
tion with which I also agree). However, it would be disingen-
uous to present this as an easy terrain to navigate in practice 
and it requires an acknowledgement of the profoundly ‘messy’, 
complicated and contextual nature of decision- making, particu-
larly in an ableist, economically unequal culture dominated by 
neo- utilitarian premises about human value. Indebted to Alison 
Piepmeier’s (Piepmeier 2013) provocative critique of dominant 
feminist framings of prenatal testing and disability, my discus-
sion of Ilana Löwy’s (Löwy 2017,2018) extensive and influential 
work on prenatal testing explores this problem with a particular 
focus on the assumptions about disability that underpin her anal-
ysis of reproductive choice including the absence of the voices of 
disabled people and the dismissal of the epistemic privilege expe-
rienced by the parents of disabled children (of which I am one) 
when this contradicts the stereotypes of “mothers as victims” 
and Downs’ syndrome as a “tragedy” (Piepmeier 2013, 165).
The final part of the essay turns to the popular genre of 
Nordic crime fiction in order to explore the articulation of ideas 
about Down’s syndrome, learning disability and parenting with 
a different epistemology of human value, thus giving rise to a 
different kind of ‘genetic fiction’ to that which I identify in work 
such as Löwy’s. The plot of Sigurdardóttir’s Someone To Look 
Over Me (2013) unfolds around the exoneration of a young man 
with Down’s syndrome who has been incarcerated for arson and 
the associated deaths of five people in the residential home in 
which he was placed. The novel is set in Iceland in the wake of 
the global financial crash of 2008, and weaves together a story 
about economic collapse, mendacity, deceit and the abuse of 
power at the centre of which are two learning disabled charac-
ters. My reading considers the ways in which ideas about art, 
disability, cognitive difference and marginality are integral to 
the novel’s critique of the economic and political culture that 
precipitated the financial crisis. I argue that Down’s syndrome 
and autism become the locus or expression of what Michel 
Foucault describes as the “insurrection of subjugated knowledg-
es”(Foucault 1980, 81), emerging from the periphery to expose 
and trouble ableist and neoliberal assumptions about what and 
who matters, concluding with a discussion of an alternative 
conception of belonging, value and identity in Garland- Thomson 
(2011) idea of “misfitting”.
VALUING PEOPLE?
Much recent scholarship in reproductive ethics and public policy 
has focused on the financial, economic and societal impact of 
disability and therefore the economic benefits of prenatal genetic 
screening for readily detectible conditions such as Down’s 
syndrome. For instance, in their essay ‘The Economic Costs of 
Childhood Disability’, (Stabile and Allin 2012) set out to calcu-
late the direct, indirect and long- term economic costs of having 
a disabled child in order to conclude “that many expensive inter-
ventions to prevent and reduce childhood disability might well 
be justified by a cost- benefit calculation” (Stabile and Allin 2012, 
65). Drawing on the work of prominent neoliberal thinkers such 
as Gary Becker and the health economist, Michael Grossman, 
the authors embrace a model of health as a “stock”, an “input 
into the production of human capital, the development of the 
competencies and knowledge that increase one’s ability to work 
and be productive” (Stabile and Allin 2012, 66). Like so much 
work in the field of health economics in the global north, there 
is no endeavour to situate the calculation of the financial costs 
associated with disability alongside any sustained ethical consid-
eration of the value of human life in all its diversity or even 
any acknowledgement of the ethical questions that circumscribe 
their approach. Their analysis draws on and reinforces a deficit 
model of disability in which the disabled child is figured only 
as the locus of parental suffering and strain, financial and soci-
etal burden. Abstracted and hypothetical, this pleasure stealing, 
resource consuming, energy sapping figure is the absent centre 
around which various forms of loss and detriment are traced. 
The uniqueness and concrete particularly of life—a life—is 
placed in parenthesis for a calculation of human value reduced 
to a stark economic logic and a narrowly conceived notion of 
productivity and societal contribution.
It is on this terrain that health economists working in advanced 
economies have produced cost/benefit evaluations of different 
screening technologies, for instance, Song et al compare the 
costs of early detection of trisomy 21 and termination with 
the costs of the first 5 years of life for a person with Down’s 
syndrome, noting that “clinical benefits are realized in the setting 
of also achieving cost savings” (Song, Musci, and Caughey 2013, 
1185). This logic characterises numerous papers that assess the 
economic advantages in particular national healthcare contexts 
of entering into a commercial relationship with the laboratories 
that produce and market the technology (Beulen et al. 2014; Hui 
and Hyett 2013; Neyt, Hulstaert, and Gyselaers 2014). As Kibel 
and Vanstone note, “Cost- effectiveness evaluations of NIPT 
often assess NIPT’s ability to deliver on goals (ie, preventing the 
birth of children with disabilities) that social and ethical analyses 
suggest it should not have” (Kibel and Vanstone 2017).
Indeed, reflecting on the ethical dilemmas to which the 
widespread adoption of technologies such as NIPT give rise, 
Megan Best has noted that the routinisation of prenatal genetic 
screening often occurs without the comprehensive counselling 
that accompanies other kinds of genetic testing and on the basis 
of an “assumed consent” rather than “true individual prefer-
ence for fetal chromosomal information” (Best 2018, 115). She 
argues that “medical counselling is often construed as a medical 
directive by the women seeking antenatal care” on the basis of 
“an innate power imbalance in the doctor- patient relationship 
which puts the woman in a position where the autonomous 
choice to screen is in fact experienced as an inability to justify 
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not doing so” (Best 2018, 116). In other words, it is very diffi-
cult to opt out of this kind of testing regime, particularly when it 
is presented as being in everyone’s best interest. If this highlights 
the difficulties that attend the realisation of informed consent 
in prenatal screening programmes, research also indicates that 
the very perception and representation of NIPT as ‘easy or just 
another blood test’ also serves as a barrier to informed decision- 
making (Cernat et al. 2019, 2) because people are not neces-
sarily aware of or prepared for the potential outcome of the test, 
although there is often an assumption that the identification of 
a genetic condition such as Down’s syndrome will end in the 
termination of the pregnancy.
When we consider questions of choice and risk in this context, 
it is also important to remember the commercial interests that 
drive the roll out of technologies such as NIPT and the ways 
in which these contribute to the creation of a culture in which 
selective abortion is routinised as an effect of the testing regime 
and consequently negative perceptions of particular conditions. 
As Piepmeier notes, “having the test isn’t a neutral situation; it 
can create and contribute to fear” (Piepmeier 2013, 166). For 
instance, NIPT is currently marketed by private health providers 
as a technique to identify a number of other, often very rare, 
genetic conditions including those caused by unusual numbers 
of the sex (X and Y) chromosomes, such as Turner syndrome 
and triple X syndrome, and those caused by small bits of DNA 
missing, called microdeletions, such as Prader- Willi syndrome 
and 5p deletion syndrome. Research indicates that NIPT is not 
particularly effective or accurate in identifying these conditions 
and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in the UK has voiced 
concerns about the tendency to present false positives in this 
context (Nuffield Council on Bioethics blog 2019; Taylor- 
Phillips et al. 2016). Marketing that claims 99% accuracy thus 
exploits and profits on understandings of risk and associated 
anxieties. This commercial logic emphasises the degree to which 
the concept of ‘choice’ must be situated in a critical analysis of 
the economic drivers that underpin the biopolitical logic of the 
prenatal diagnosis (PND) apparatus.
SCREENING FOR TRISOMY 21: DOWN’S SYNDROME AS THE 
PARADIGMATIC POSITIVE RESULT OF PND
As outlined above, the centrality of ideas of disability as a cost 
(emotional, familial, financial, societal) to the ideological justi-
fication and implementation of screening programmes is an 
important reminder of the systemic ableism that has long char-
acterised healthcare as a biopolitical apparatus, the provision of 
which is often shaped by neoliberal and neo- utilitarian principles 
rather than the endeavour fully to recognise the value of human 
diversity. Indeed, if we consider the history of prenatal genetic 
screening and diagnosis in more detail, it is evident that the artic-
ulation of utilitarianism and ableism is deeply imbricated in the 
development of this area of genomic medicine.
Prenatal diagnosis or PND refers to the “scrutiny of the fetus 
coupled with the option to terminate pregnancy” (Löwy 2018) 
and was established as a routine element of pregnancy care in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its implementation was the 
product, as medical anthropologist Ilana Löwy notes, of “four 
distinct developments in biomedicine—the perfection of amnio-
centesis, the rise of cytogenetics (the genetic study of cells), the 
application of new biochemical approaches to the study of amni-
otic fluid and pregnant women’s serum, and the development 
of obstetrical ultrasound”—along with the decriminalisation of 
abortion in some countries (Löwy 2018, 3). The identification 
of a fetus with trisomy 21 is, as Löwy notes, “the paradigmatic 
positive result of PND” and the paradigmatic justification for the 
termination of pregnancy (Löwy 2018, 220). Löwy cites Susan 
Lindee’s assertion that “the selective abortion of affected fetuses 
was and remains the primary intervention of genomic medicine” 
noting that this rationale is embedded in the 20th century history 
of clinical genetics (Lindee 2002; Löwy 2018, 5) and manifest in 
the concerns of early genetic researchers such as Julia Bell (the 
scientist who identified Fragile X). In a correspondence in the 
British Medical Journal, Bell focused on three main concerns:
1. The risks of severe handicap to the unborn child.
2. The risks of acute distress and difficulty for the potential parent, 
perhaps for the rest of her life.
3. The burden likely to rest on the Welfare state (Bell 1959, 1302; 
Löwy 2018, 203).
Bell’s reference to “the burden likely to rest upon the Welfare 
state” demonstrates the degree to which the history of genomic 
discourse is entangled with biopolitical and economic consid-
erations that subject the value of some lives to the instrumen-
talist logic of the cost/benefit analysis based on perceptions of 
societal burden. Indeed, the development of prenatal testing 
and the establishment of health economics as a subdiscipline 
of economics emerge in the same period. Löwy notes that 
“in discussing the decision to introduce screening for Down’s 
syndrome in France, a French public health expert explains that 
politicians could not openly admit that their aim was to reduce 
the number of children born with chromosomal anomalies in 
order to decrease the costs of care for these children” (Löwy 
2018, 213). The barely concealed hostility to “disability rights 
activists” that surfaces throughout Löwy’s work is underpinned 
by a similar economic logic, noting that the decision to have an 
“impaired child”runs the risk of “depleting the family’s financial 
and emotional resources” in a context of “uncertainty about the 
fate of disabled people in economically and politically unstable 
times” (Löwy 2018, 214):
Few people object to the principle that society should provide suffi-
cient help to disabled persons and their families. But acceptance of 
the generous principle is hampered by practical difficulties in fulfill-
ing all the urgent and often competing societal needs (Löwy 2018, 
161).
Löwy’s position here brings together a feminist pro- choice 
perspective with a neo- utilitarian and deficit led view of disa-
bility; the ‘impaired child’ is associated with depletion, insecu-
rity and unwarranted burden. In this respect, her response is 
emblematic of the resignification of liberationist themes from 
feminism in the era of globalisation and financial crisis, and 
of a version of feminism that happily coexists with ableism. 
Löwy presents an argument for gender equality predicated on 
reproductive autonomy that goes hand in hand with an ableist 
justification of political and ethical inequality ideologically legit-
imated in overtly economic terms. In Löwy’s words, prenatal 
diagnosis is useful as a “gendered risk management technology” 
(Löwy 2018, 15) in which the pregnant person essentially either 
chooses to assert themselves and their autonomy or consent to 
their own subjugation to the insatiable wants and needs of their 
disabled child, a decision that is implicitly framed as selfish act in 
light of “all the urgent and competing societal needs”.
This kind of emphasis and understanding of ‘choice’ and 
autonomy underpins a number of feminist writings on repro-
ductive rights (Rothman 1993; Bender and de Gramont 2010) 
and, as Alison Kafer puts it, makes “disability do the work of 
defending abortion” on the basis of profoundly discriminatory 
stereotypes about disabled people’s lives and experiences of 
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parenting disabled children (Kafer 2013, 167). The notion of 
‘risk management’ in work such as Löwy’s is framed by a stark 
economic rationality and an attendant conception of disability 
as parasitical dependency and familial burden. There is little 
consideration of “messier questions and concerns” (Piepmeier 
2013, 176) and the intimate, familial, communal and socioeco-
nomic contexts that frame decision- making and delimit the idea 
of ‘choice’ as some unmediated expression of individual volition. 
As Piepmeier suggests, shifting the focus from an individualised 
framework to one based on the principle of reproductive justice 
requires a response that attends to and recognises the ‘humanity’ 
of disabled people and the relationships between human rights 
and economic justice in order to “create communities that make 
decisions possible” (Piepmeier 2013, 182).
The expressivist objection
The longstanding disquiet about the implications of prenatal 
genetic testing for many disability scholars and activists is 
known as the expressivist objection. This argument claims that 
to eliminate a particular genetic trait through selective abortion 
“expresses (and presupposes) negative, extremely damaging 
judgements about the value of disabled persons” (Edwards 2004; 
Gonter 2004). In an oft- cited passage from The Rejected Body 
(1996), the feminist philosopher Susan Wendell argues that:
the widespread use of selective abortion to reduce the number of 
people born with disabilities … sends a message to children and 
adults with disabilities, especially people who have genetic or pre-
natal disabilities, that “we do not want any more like you” (Wendell 
1996, 153).
In a similar vein, Adrienne Asch argues that prenatal testing 
repeats and reinforces the same tendency towards letting the 
part, that is, a single trait, stand in for the whole; a metonymic 
impulse that characterises discriminatory attitudes towards disa-
bled people more generally (Asch in Parens and Asch 1999, S2). 
In other words, it reproduces the tendency to reduce and flatten 
disabled peoples’ lives to the contours of a specific impairment 
or diagnostic category as if a particular label ‘unlocks’ or explains 
everything about a disabled person, or all a non- disabled person 
might need to know.
This expressivist objection to prenatal testing has been char-
acterised as ‘avoiding difficult questions’ by scholars such as 
Löwy and as theoretically incoherent by bioethicists such as 
John Harris (John 2000). Harris, who is unapologetic in his 
conviction that “people should practise eugenics, if by that is 
understood the attempt to produce healthy, non- disabled chil-
dren” (John 2000, 99) also argues that “deliberately to make 
a reproductive choice knowing that the resulting child will be 
significantly disabled is morally problematic, and often morally 
wrong” (John 2000, 96). Likewise, Richard Dawkins has argued 
that there is a ‘moral’ imperative’ to terminate a pregnancy if 
Down’s syndrome is detected on the basis of an impression-
istic and unevidenced claim that the birth of a disabled infant 
increases the amount of suffering in the world (Dawkins 2014). 
Others such as Daniel Brock have made similar arguments to 
Harris and Dawkins but have endeavoured to do so in response 
to aspects of the expressivist objection in a manner which, as 
Eva Kittay brilliantly demonstrates, is often opaque and rather 
incoherent itself (Brock 1995, 2004, 2005).
As Kittay argues, the most notable characteristic of these 
attempts “to secure a moral requirement to select against disa-
bility, while wishing to avoid denigrating disabled people” is that 
they remain wedded to a deficit- led conception of disability as 
“only the occasion for suffering” (Kittay 2017, 185). In other 
words, they unfold around a vision of disabled life as worse 
than no life at all and argue that to entertain the realisation of 
such a life is to affect harm in the “creation of a world with 
less opportunity”or “diminished”opportunity (Kittay 2017, 
189). As Alison Kafer notes, “if disability is conceptualised as a 
terrible unending tragedy, then any future that includes disability 
can only be a future to avoid […] the value of a disability- free 
future is seen as self- evident” (Kafer 2013, 2) As Kafer’s work 
emphasises, these arguments in which screening out disability is 
justified as a ‘moral imperative’ depend on an entirely abstract 
projection, an “imagined future” (Kafer 2013, 2) and therefore 
an essentially fictional construct of disability, cut adrift from 
the concrete particularities that might give it any substantive 
meaning. As Kittay notes,
Life is so strewn with contingencies that the presence or absence of 
a disability in an individual’s life is still a poor predictor of what 
would be a better life for that person. The child who is without sig-
nificant impairments may be born into a family that is not quite as 
loving, not quite as resourceful, not quite as accepting, as a person 
with severe impairments. A significantly impaired child blessed with 
loving parents, and a supportive environment, and undaunted by the 
challenges of her impairment, may flourish and have a wonderful life. 
[…] The ceteris paribus clause leaves us with an empty abstraction, an 
idealized condition with little relevance to our nonidealized world. It 
cannot support the claim that a disabled life, all things considered, is 
a worse life than an able one (Kittay 2017, 187).
Any engagement with lived experience or indeed any contex-
tualised comparison of moments of pleasure, enjoyment, loss 
and pain in disabled and non- disabled lives would complicate 
and disturb the singular, condemnatory logic of this kind of 
ethical position in which the potential harms of an unlived life 
are imagined and flow from a fundamentally impoverished and 
ableist view of disability. It is notable that the perspectives of 
people with learning disabilities such as Down’s syndrome are 
rarely included in these bioethical pronouncements, although in 
their recent consultation about the adoption of NIPT in the UK, 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics managed to record the views 
of six people who identified with this label (Barter 2017).
However, it is not simply the imagined suffering of the not yet 
born disabled child but also crucially the imagined suffering of 
the family of that child that comes into play in these debates. In 
her work on prenatal testing, Löwy, for instance, is scathing in 
her condemnation of unnamed ‘disability activists’ for suggesting 
that there are “substantial gratifications and unexpected joys”as-
sociated with raising what she describes as “a special- needs 
child” (Löwy 2018, 219). “It is difficult to achieve credibility”, 
she notes, “through the telling of partial truths” (Löwy 2018, 
220). As this suggests, it is difficult for her to imagine that the 
life of someone with a child with a learning disability could be 
anything other than abject and unalloyed misery and this, in 
turn, produces a constitutive suspicion of any argument to the 
contrary. Löwy resists any acknowledgement of the epistemic 
privilege that being the parent of a disabled child confers but 
instead reflects this back as either ‘over- compensation’ or self- 
deception (the ‘telling of partial truths’), invalidating personal 
testimony on the basis that it cannot possibly be ‘true’ if it does 
not conform to the abstracted deficit model from which her 
analysis proceeds.
Genetic fictions and the significance of the literary
My aim in the sections above is to highlight the function and 
centrality of Down’s syndrome to discussions about prenatal 
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genetic testing, the intersection of economic and medical 
discourses and to identify the main characters or subjects that 
that populate dominant discourses around screening practices; 
the yet to be born infant with Down’s syndrome and the poten-
tial yet to be materialised parent of that child. Crucially, we need 
to recognise that these imagined or projected subjects are distinct 
effects of this apparatus. They are genetic fictions so to speak 
that express, as Piepmeier notes, “a culture with skewed, dehu-
manising views of disability” (Piepmeier 2013, 163) in which 
Down’s syndrome and being the parent of a child with Down’s 
syndrome are often freighted with a raft of negative attributes, 
casting a disabled life as intrinsically diminished and burden-
some. We might describe this assemblage of practices, ideas and 
pressures as producing a hostile environment because there is 
very little space here afforded to disabled people’s voices or the 
concrete particularities of lived experience in all its variability. 
Instead, these spectral projections function as empty place-
holders, harbingers of tragedy, depletion, deficit and struggle. 
These “grim imagined futures”, as Kafer puts it (Kafer 2013, 
2), fail to capture the diverse realities of people’s lives and rela-
tionships and often compel disabled people and their families to 
justify their very existence and the quality and value of their lives 
in order to provide a counternarrative, a pressure to justify life 
itself rarely, if ever, experienced by non- disabled people.
I want to turn now to a consideration of the representation 
of Down’s syndrome, learning disability and parenthood in the 
popular genre of Nordic crime writing in order to explore the 
ways in a piece of genre fiction, specifically Icelandic author 
Yrsa Sigurdartottir’s novel Someone to Watch over me (2013), 
both engages with and troubles the kind of ableist, neoliberal 
and neo- utilitarian constructions of human value that I have 
been exploring and which underpin the place of trisomy 21 
in the apparatus of prenatal genetic testing and its ideological 
centrality to the idea that some lives are disposable, not worth 
living or to be prevented for the benefit of the parent, family 
or society. My reading focuses on the ways in which the novel 
opens up a space for the expression of alternative conceptions 
of what and who matters within a broader consideration of the 
relationship between the law, social and economic justice and the 
activities of the state.
My decision to write about an Icelandic novel in this context 
is worth briefly reflecting on. In 2017, various global news 
reports indicated that Iceland was on the brink of becoming 
the first country to ‘eliminate’ Down’s syndrome, prompting 
renewed debate about the potential ‘screening out’ of particular 
groups of people and the emergence and cultural acceptance of a 
‘new’ eugenics. Although these reports about the eradication of 
Down’s syndrome in Iceland have been disputed, not least by the 
Icelandic government, screening for chromosomal conditions 
is a well- established element of prenatal care (although NIPT 
is not currently offered), and over the last 10 years, only two 
to three children with Down’s syndrome have been born each 
year, making Siggurdartottir’s decision to write about Down’s 
syndrome in her novel, significant (Government of Iceland 
2018). Iceland also has a distinct—possibly unique—national 
experience in relation to the interactions between the state and 
a commercial biotech DeCODE genetics/Amgen, with its aspi-
rations to capitalise on large- scale whole- genome sequencing 
of the Icelandic population (Fortun 2008; Gudbjartsson et al. 
2015). The DeCODE project was initially framed and marketed 
in the 1990s in relation to the perceived homogeneity of the 
population and the genealogy of the nation reaching centuries 
back in time, evoking images of an unbroken lineage of Viking 
warriors and notions of racial purity (Burke 2012, 200). Ethical 
debates around emergent genetic technologies and the implica-
tions of commercial relationships between the state, citizens and 
profit- making corporations are therefore culturally prominent 
and the subject of sustained reflection in novels such as Indri-
dason (2006) Tainted Blood. Finally, the financial crisis of 2008 
and subsequent recession in Iceland had major political ramifica-
tions and exposing the limitations and destructiveness of finan-
cial deregulation and neoliberal economics.
These concrete cultural determinants coalesce in the novel’s 
articulation of the relationships between the marginalised and the 
powerful in the context of a post- crash society enabling a textual 
reframing of the dominant representations of Down’s syndrome 
and parental burden that I have identified in the apparatus of 
prenatal testing and indeed, particular, non- intersectional, femi-
nist writings on reproductive autonomy. Whereas the latter 
practices are often predicated on the erasure of the disabled 
subject as a someone with significance beyond attributions of 
suffering and burden, my reading illuminates the way in which 
the novel endows its least powerful characters with an epis-
temic privilege that exposes the systemic corruption, exploita-
tion and greed that precipitated the global financial crisis, and 
which is predicated on a narrowly conceived and constitutively 
ableist conception of human value. In making this argument, I 
am also making a claim for the value of the literary and literary 
critical practices as equally important fields for exploring the 
ethical and political questions raised by genetic screening prac-
tices, health economics and feminist considerations of reproduc-
tive autonomy and intersectionality. As Mikhail Bakhtin argues, 
we can locate the ethical and political significance of novelistic 
discourse in its formal capacity to dialogise and defamiliarise 
different and competing social discourses, drawing our attention 
to asymmetrical distributions of power and authority (Bakhtin 
2010, 262). What this means is that novelistic discourse offers a 
distinctive space wherein we encounter plural and often antag-
onistic discourses from different spheres, for instance, the polit-
ical, the legal, the scientific and the technical playing out their 
contradictions through the stories of particular individuals and 
collectives facing particular sets of circumstances and challenges. 
Unlike the ‘genetic fictions’, we encounter in the discourses and 
practices of medicine or health economics then, my argument is 
that Someone to Watch Over Me presents a more capacious and 
generous space in which eccentric or marginal voices can break 
through the dominant and often exclusionary frameworks of the 
hostile environment faced by disabled people today.
Subjugated knowledges and misfitting: Someone to Watch 
Over Me
Someone To Watch Over Me can be described as an allegory of 
the failure of the state to protect or ‘watch over’ its citizens in 
the wake of the rapid expansion and subsequent collapse of the 
Icelandic banking system. The narrative unfolds in the context 
of the severe financial crisis in Iceland following the global crash 
of 2008 in which overly enthusiastic Icelandic bankers played 
a small but significant role. The conventional ‘who done it’ of 
crime fiction is conjoined in the text with a ‘who didn’t do it’. 
The lawyer Thora Gudmundsdottir is employed to establish the 
innocence of Jakob, a young man with Down’s syndrome held 
in a secure psychiatric unit at Sogn for arson and the killing of 
five people in the residential care home in which he was placed 
against his will. Thora receives her instructions and payment 
from Josteinn Karlsson, a convicted paedophile serving an 
indefinite sentence in the same psychiatric unit on the grounds 
of “acute schizophrenia and other personality disorders” (17). 
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The quest to exonerate Jakob takes place between January and 
March 2010 and traverses the key institutional spaces of biopo-
litical governmentality: the hospital, the prison, the Regional 
Office for the Disabled, the Ministry of Justice.
That the psychopathic Josteinn is the catalyst for Thora’s 
endeavour is indicative of a constitutive suspiciousness or sense 
of unease that pervades the story and threatens to destabilise 
the realist conventions of the crime genre itself. This unease 
is played out in frequent references to foul smells, breathing 
difficulties, panic and anxiety, suggesting something rotten at 
the heart of the society the novel describes. This is particularly 
evident in the Gothic undertow of the subnarrative that acts 
as a framing device for the main narrative about Jakob. This 
narrative describes the apparent ‘haunting’ of a family whose 
babysitter was killed in a hit and run accident on the way to look 
after their young son. The relationship of this framing narrative 
to Jakob’s story is unclear until the very end of the novel when 
the identity of the hit and run driver is revealed. The driver turns 
out to be Fanndis, the wife of Einvardur, a high- ranking offi-
cial in the Ministry of Justice and mother of Tryggvi, a young 
man with autism who later dies in the fire at the care home for 
which Jakob is held responsible. What is ultimately revealed in 
the narrative then is a cover up and an act of injustice towards 
Jakob that originates at the very heart of the state, rather than 
as is first suggested in the apparent deviance of a marginalised 
individual with Down’s syndrome.
The generic and thematic disturbance encapsulated in the 
gothic elements of the text is bound up with a sense of profound 
distrust in individuals and institutions as a consequence of 
multiple and intersecting forms of risky behaviour. These behav-
iours include the failure to install a sprinkler system in the rapidly 
constructed ‘state of the art’ residential home in which Jakob is 
forced to live, the failure of the night staff in the home to protect 
its inhabitants from harm, including the rape of a young woman 
in a coma, and the use of the residents’ intravenous drips and 
oxygen in the sale of hangover treatments for young people in 
the vicinity. Ari, the original and corrupt lawyer assigned both to 
Josteinn and Jakob’s case is a gambling addict who throws out 
“his bills unopened” and fails in his professional obligation to 
represent his clients’ best interests, and Einvardur, a senior figure 
in the Ministry of Justice, is ultimately revealed to be complicit 
in the cover up of his wife’s role in the hit and run accident. The 
novel is thus populated with figures who behave irresponsibly, 
violating professional codes and ethical norms while seeking to 
conceal their culpability by assigning blame to Jakob.
The weakening of trust in the institutions of the state is most 
powerfully expressed in the symbolic alignment of the paedo-
phile Josteinn and Ministry of Justice official Einvardur. These 
figures superficially at least are presented in opposition to one 
another. The recipient of ‘justice’, Josteinn, is described as phys-
ically abhorrent with thinning dark, slicked back hair, “yellow 
teeth” and “sour- smelling breath” that makes Thora recoil 
(128). In contrast, Einvardur Tryggvason, the agent of justice, 
is ‘spotless’:
His dark elegant suit appeared to shine and it was as if he’d just got 
up from the barber’s chair after a haircut and a close shave. His smile 
revealed white teeth that weren’t completely straight, but which gave 
him a character that defined the difference between a good- looking 
real person and a model. Strange as it might have seemed, it was pre-
cisely this imperfection that made him appear perfect (145).
Einvardur is initially approached by Thora (the lawyer) 
because Einvardur’s ‘severely autistic’ son, Tryggvi, died in the 
fire at the care home. We learn that prior to his death, Tryggvi 
was the recipient of an ‘unorthodox’ therapy that, we discover 
later, enables him to produce drawings of the hit and run acci-
dent. His endeavour to represent this traumatic experience and 
his new communicative intent causes his family rapidly to bring 
his therapy to an end in order to prevent him from revealing 
his mother’s culpability for the hit and run. The conviction of 
Jakob, orchestrated by Einvardur, is also used to divert attention 
from the family. This includes covering up the role of Einvar-
dur’s daughter, Lena, in the fire itself. Einvardur’s ‘spotlessness’ 
and preparedness to sacrifice Jakob is symbolically aligned with 
Josteinn’s pathological inability to recognise or empathise with 
his victims. The use of ‘appearance’ in these descriptions is 
significant then in that it gestures towards the essentially untrust-
worthy nature of Einvardur as a figure and by extension the 
fundamental untrustworthiness of the apparatus of justice itself. 
The novel, in this sense, encapsulates the emergence of a new 
‘structure of feeling’ (Williams 1977, 132) predicated on loss of 
faith in traditional state institutions and practices via a depiction 
of these key ‘actors’ as intrinsically unprincipled and self- serving.
Having mapped out the main elements of the narrative, I want 
to argue that the centrality of figures with learning disabilities 
in the novel is not incidental but integral to its engagement with 
questions of truth and justice. Thora’s quest unfolds as a well- 
meaning and soul- searching liberal education in the genetic diag-
nosis, health concerns and symptomatic characteristics of Down’s 
syndrome and autism and culminates in her acceptance of the 
value of Jakob’s life. We see her reflect on Jakob’s behaviour and 
looks, the decisions that Jakob’s mother has made and what it 
means to love a disabled child. If these reflections are somewhat 
stock responses to disability and Downs’ syndrome, what makes 
the novel interesting is the revelation that Jakob and Tryggvi are 
the repositories of ‘truth’ from the outset, although the ways in 
which they reveal the criminal acts that they have witnessed are 
not initially understood. Structurally speaking then, the revela-
tion of ‘truth’ and justice is located not at the centre but at the 
periphery in the discourse of these marginal figures of disposable 
life. Jakob, in particular, is arguably emblematic of the broader 
vulnerability of citizens in the current post-2008 conjuncture. To 
maintain fictions of autonomy and choice under conditions of 
economic crisis here means that certain lives have to be sacrificed 
both literally and politically in order to protect those in a posi-
tion of power. As the novel reveals, Fanndis’ guilt is concealed by 
the sacrifice of her son, Tryggvi, and the decision to silence him 
through the termination of his therapy. She is further protected 
by the indefinite incarceration of Jakob on the grounds of mental 
capacity. The assumption that Jakob and Tryggvi are disposable 
and unworthy of equal recognition and protection is ultimately 
challenged in the text in order to illuminate the corruption and 
inequality at the heart of a legal and political system that fails to 
value their lives.
Michel Foucault’s elaboration of the concept of “subjugated 
knowledges” is helpful here in making sense of the significance 
of Jakob and Tryggvi to the revelation to truth in the novel. 
Foucault points to “historical contents that have been buried or 
masked in functional coherences or formal systemizations […] a 
whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as non- 
conceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: 
naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowl-
edges that are below the required level of erudition or scienti-
ficity” (Foucault 1980, 81). What we see in Tryggvi’s drawings 
and Jakob’s testimony is precisely the expression of ‘non- 
conceptual and insufficiently elaborated knowledges’ whose 
very emergence exposes the ethical limitations and brutality of 
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the dominant epistemological frameworks that systematically 
disqualify or mask them.
I want to return then with this in mind to my earlier discussion 
of Löwy’s work and the apparatus of prenatal screening. Even 
the briefest of engagements with debates in health economics, 
bioethics and the work of scholars such as Löwy, indicate that 
the values of autonomy, choice, recognition and risk manage-
ment are increasingly bound up with the exclusion of particular 
subjects, particularly those whose strong difference challenges 
deeply entrenched ableist norms. However, as this discussion 
indicates, arguments that support the principle of screening out 
Down’s syndrome as either a ‘moral imperative’ or a rational 
choice in a time of austerity do so via the repetition and reit-
eration of a decontextualised and abstracted idea—or genetic 
fiction—about what that label means, projecting meaning onto 
lives that have not yet been lived. This is a promissory discourse 
that unfolds around the assumption that a life with Down’s 
syndrome is essentially a life not worth living and it operates 
on a discursive level itself to screen out any recognition of the 
diverse, shifting and myriad experiences that make up any life. 
It is precisely this ableist premise with which Siggurdartottir’s 
novel opens but which its narrative comes to dismantle. In the 
novel, the structural position of Tryggvi and Jakob gives rise 
to an epistemic privilege that serves to trouble normative and 
ableist conceptions of value, and about what and who matters, 
opening up a space in which the revelation of truth and the reali-
sation of justice are located in the most socially marginal figures.
It is here—in conclusion and in defence of lives easily 
construed as unworthy of living—that I want to introduce 
Rosemarie Garland- Thomson’s concept of misfitting. The term 
describes a critical practice that acknowledges the complex and 
material particularities of disabled peoples’ lives and the capacity 
to produce subjugated knowledges from which “an oppositional 
consciousness and politicised identity might arise” (Garland- 
Thomson 2011, 598). Fitting as she notes,
…is a comfortable and unremarkable majority experience of material 
anonymity … when we fit harmoniously into the world, we forget 
the truth of contingency because the world sustains us. When we 
experience misfitting, we recognise that disjuncture for its politi-
cal potential, we expose the relational component and the fragility 
of fitting. Any of us can fit here today and misfit there tomorrow 
(Garland- Thomson 2011, 598).
In the current discussions of NIPT and prenatal diagnosis, 
Down’s syndrome operates as a ‘master signifier’ of disability, 
the paradigmatic difference to be identified, and the risk to be 
managed and, in the majority of cases, screened out. What is so 
important about Garland- Thomson’s argument is its emphasis on 
the complex particularities of people’s lives and the fragility and 
transience of ‘fitting’ itself. Such a position rejects the abstracted 
genetic fictions that emerge in the pedagogy of parental burden 
and discourse of ethical ‘harm’. Instead, this prompts us to recog-
nise that it is not possible to eliminate human vulnerability or 
contingency, to accept that ‘misfitting’ is something anyone can 
experience at any point. Yet as Garland- Thomson notes, and as 
I tried to bring out in my reading of the novel, this very fact has 
the capacity to produce an oppositional consciousness; to reim-
agine the world in a way that is attentive and open to the varied 
particularities of disabled lives, an openness that goes beyond the 
reductive ableist prisms of tragedy and burden that predominate 
in biomedical and even certain strands of feminist thinking.
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